This Article Free Full Text (Free PDF) Free Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Insole, C. J. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

The Truth Behind Practices: Wittgenstein, Robinson Crusoe and Ecclesiology

Department of Theology and Religion, University of Durham, Abbey House, Palace Green, Durham DH1 3RS, christopher.insole{at}durham.ac.uk

The Wittgensteinian claim that meaning is immanent to 'practices', influential in contemporary theology, is capable of two readings: the first takes `practice' to refer to the social activities of actual communities; the second implies no more than a way of going on that is in principle communicable. The first reading is palpably unattractive, both philosophically and exegetically; the second reading is much less ambitious, providing a plausible critique of empiricist theories of meaning. I suggest that it is the first implausible reading that is often at work in theological appropriations of Wittgenstein, such as we find in Stanley Hauerwas. I fill-out this claim by exploring — with an ear to Scripture — the implications for ecclesiology of adopting either of the two readings. I conclude by raising the alarm about two dangers: of being too Wittgensteinian in some respects, and not Wittgensteinian enough in others.

Key Words: church • community • ecclesiology • Hauerwas • practices • truth • theology • Wittgenstein

Studies in Christian Ethics, Vol. 20, No. 3, 364-382 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/0953946807082933


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?